Wealth Strategies
Changing Face Of Credit: The $4.5 Billion SoftBank Deal

A recent major credit market move involving the Japanese conglomerate shows how far the sector of private debt and alternative lending has changed, the author of this article argues.
The debt market continues to evolve as investors hunt for yield in an environment of very low interest rates. At the same time risks in certain areas, such as high-yield, make those whose job it is to protect wealth nervous. Corporate debt in the US has been a source of worry for some time. Another trend is the growth of private credit, so much so that along with other private capital markets, there were mutterings about “dry powder” – money waiting to be deployed – even before the coronavirus pandemic hit.
A recent major deal involving SoftBank, the Tokyo-based conglomerate, intensifies focus on this topic. To analyse it is Lachlan Campbell, Asia chief executive at Equities First Holdings. (More details below on the author.)
(It should be noted that yesterday, reports (Wall Street Journal, others) said that SoftBank Group Corp., which poured nearly $100 billion into start-ups in recent years, said on Monday that it will offload billions of dollars in assets to support its falling equity price and protect its balance sheet following the threat of a ratings downgrade.)
The editors are pleased to share these views; as always, the comments of guest contributors carry editorial disclaimers. To reply, email tom.burroughes@wealthbriefing.com and jackie.bennion@clearviewpublishing.com
One of the most influential technology investment firms in the world, SoftBank Group, made headlines in early February when it announced the completion of a $4.5 billion financing package from 16 financial institutions.
The key factor that set this transaction apart was SoftBank’s
decision to pledge shares of its telecom subsidiary, SoftBank
Corp, as collateral for the loan. This structure allowed SoftBank
to access capital on flexible, non-purpose and non-recourse terms
by making more efficient use of its existing assets.
While this particular transaction is in a class of its own in
terms of visibility and scale, it marks a broad shift in the
overall credit landscape which is subject to both investor demand
and borrower needs for flexible liquidity. As with SoftBank,
rather than rely on a complex and lengthy public bond issuance to
access liquidity, borrowers are increasingly turning to private
credit.
Conversely, investors searching for higher-yield opportunities
are allocating more capital to private credit strategies such as
direct lending and asset-backed lending. This is taking place in
the context of current market turmoil and liquidity contraction
from banks. As with the SoftBank transaction, private credit and
innovative debt structures are becoming an important source of
alternative financing.
Taking a closer look at the SoftBank deal, it is important to
note several features that characterise the transaction.
First, by posting a 20 per cent stake of its subsidiary as
collateral for a loan, SoftBank has been able to unlock liquidity
while maintaining long-term beneficial ownership.
Second, the loan is non-purpose which means that the proceeds can
be used dynamically to meet business needs as management sees
fit.
Third, because this type of financing is “non-recourse”,
Softbank’s liability is limited to the shares pledged should it
become unable (or simply choose not to) repay the loan. Its other
assets and credit would not be subject to legal action or be
seized as restitution.
Worth noting is the loan-to-value ratio in the SoftBank
transaction (as with most other equity-backed financings) was
just above 30 per cent. This means that Softbank received only 30
cents on every dollar of stock they pledged for the loan, which
is far more favourable for the lender. Furthermore, given the
size of that haircut, it is highly unlikely that Softbank will
take advantage of the non-recourse feature.
With a higher loan-to-value borrowers may consider a non-recourse
financing to act as an implicit long-term hedge against the
position. This is especially valuable in cases where the borrower
has concentrated exposure to one stock. A higher
LTV permits asset owners to lock-in current valuations
and access liquidity while simultaneously retaining all potential
upside exposure to their equity assets over the life of the
loan.
The Softbank transaction cannot be viewed in isolation, however.
The general interest in asset-backed and equity-backed lending
deal flow as an alternative source of financing in Asia is
significantly on the rise. In China alone, there are now over
RMB1 trillion in equity-backed loans outstanding. This demand has
come largely from listed companies and their key stakeholders
(founding families and senior management) pledging their own
shares in order to access liquidity in a timely manner.
Tightening bank credit has been a key driver for these listed
company stakeholders.
In parallel, an important trend towards private credit strategies
is taking place in the fund allocation space. We are witnessing
an historic shift of investor assets into private debt
strategies, including direct lending, mezzanine debt, distressed
debt, special situations funds and, of course, asset-backed debt.
Fund allocators are searching for higher yielding opportunities
and want to diversify away from equities. Pension funds in
particular have been moving away from hedge fund allocations
towards private credit opportunities.
During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, banks aggressively
raised their risk limits and cut their credit funding to de-risk
their balance sheets, accepting mainly blue-chip stocks with high
liquidity and low volatility for equity-backed financing
purposes. This left a broad universe of borrowers and companies
underserved or without access to practical financing solutions.
We are again experiencing significant volatility in financial
markets with investor confidence and risk appetites turning
negative.
It is now conceivable that we may enter a prolonged period of
aggressive bank de-risking and liquidity contraction. This
environment should create increased demand and opportunities for
new players with ample liquidity (such as family offices, pension
funds, and specialist credit funds) to enter the private debt
space. Equity-backed financing, especially, allows borrowers to
remain nimble and reactive without having to liquidate long-term
investments, dismantle legacies or lose control of their
businesses.
Equities First Holdings sees many similarities between this
transaction and our own model. As an asset-backed loan specialist
we welcome the growth and evolution of the private debt and
alternative lending space. As a pioneer in asset-backed financing
for more than 17 years, we operate in every major market across
the globe. A robust ecosystem of borrowers, lenders and other
counterparties translates into an increase in the quantity and
quality of investment opportunities. We anticipate seeing more
deals of the same calibre as the SoftBank transaction come
through as new capital and demand dynamics grow the private debt
market to new prominence.
About the Author:
Lachlan Campbell is the Asia Chief Executive Officer of Equities First Holdings, a global institutional investor which specialises in equity-backed financing. The firm is wholly-owned, privately funded and deals only with professional and accredited investors. In his role as Asia CEO, Lachlan oversees all strategic planning, business development, operations, regulatory compliance, and marketing functions at EFH Hong Kong and all of EFH’s Asian subsidiaries.
With nearly three decades of financial services and executive management experience, Lachlan brings expertise in buy-side multi-strategy platform and operations development, institutional client development, and regulatory compliance management to EFH. Prior to joining EFH, Lachlan served in various senior executive, management and business development roles at CLSA, Pine River, Income Partners, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and PwC, over his professional career.
The contents of this article are the personal views of Mr Campbell and do not represent the views of Equities First Holdings.